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Set against the colonial and neo-colonial unevenness of the globalised neoliberal order, this article offers a critical 
reading of legal personhood and jurisdiction as mechanisms of privilege and predation. Transnational corporations 
(TNCs) are, we suggest, the ultimate insider construct for the neoliberal capitalist-techno order. Meanwhile, 
increasing numbers of corporeal human beings on the move as the marginalised products of that same order 
(especially refugees and migrants) are confronted by boundaries and barriers all too material in their effect. 
In an age of anxiety-driven border-hardening against mass human migration and of seamless, instantaneous 
movements of transnational capital and corporate location across jurisdictional boundaries, we examine the 
patterns of injustice implicated in and between these phenomena, tracing a Eurocentric logic visible in the complex 
continuities between coloniality, capitalism and the production of precarity in the Anthropocene. 
Keywords: Legal personhood; jurisdiction; walls; coloniality/neocoloniality; neoliberalism; transnational 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this article, we offer a critical reading of personhood and jurisdiction set against the globalised 
juridical order and the stark contrast between the privilege of transnational corporations (TNCs)1 
and the barriers and exclusions facing marginalised, corporeally specific human beings.2 We trace 
threads of continuity between the colonial past, the neoliberal present, and the functions of legal 
personhood and jurisdiction as mechanisms of exclusion and control.  
   The scale of the global is, of course, central to Anthropocene, and Haraway—pointing 
this out, has also rightly argued that the global is highly specific in its historical and material origins 
and development.3 Folded into the antecedents of Anthropocene crises—including climate 
change as the Anthropocene’s ‘most salient and perilous transgression of Holocene 
parameters’4—lies the colonial past and a neocolonial present.5 Deepening levels of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* We would like to thank, for their warm feedback on an earlier draft: Richard Falk, Susan Marks and Upendra Baxi, 
and for some useful editorial suggestions, Sam Adelman. We would also like to thank Stephen Humphreys for his 
generous provision of anonymous reviewer comments; the anonymous reviewers of the JHRE; and Louis Kotze 
and Julia Dehm for their valuable guidance and observations. Any errors, of course, remain ours alone. 
1 TNCs enjoy considerable, organised advantages in the world order. See, for a useful discussion, JG Ruggie, 
‘Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and relative autonomy’ (2017) Regulation & Governance, 
(doi: 10.1111/rego.12154.  Date of last access: 26th November 2018).  
2 S Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2014). Pressures are only likely to multiply with climate change driven displacements and deepening insecurity: J 
Barnett and WN Adger, ‘Climate change, human security and violent conflict’ (2007) 26 Political Geography 639-655. 
3  D Haraway, ‘Anthropocene, Capitolocene, Chthulucene: Staying with the Trouble’, a lecture given by Donna 
Haraway at University of California, Santa Cruz on 5th September 2014, available at https://vimeo.com/97663518  
(last accessed 26th November 2018), 14.02. 
4 A Malm and A Hornborg, ‘The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the Anthropocene Narrative’ (2014) 1/1 The 
Anthropocene Review 62–69, 63. 
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vulnerability have been directly related to neoliberal globalisation,6 and the antecedents of 
contemporary injustices—including climate injustices—have been directly related to well-
rehearsed, highly uneven distributions of life and death in patterns of capitalist coloniality 
reflected in the industrialisation and plunder7 intensifying the trajectory towards the 
Anthropocene.8  
  In this article we are particularly concerned to foreground the unevenness of processes 
of neoliberal globalisation,9 and it is against this unevenness that we position our reflections on 
personhood and jurisdiction. Our particular interest in writing this reflection first emerged from 
noting the marked contrast between TNCs as highly mutable, mobile agents of the global order, 
and the rapid proliferation of walls and barriers confronting human beings on the move in the 
‘the age of walls’.10 We refer to ‘TNC privilege’ as a way of expressing the fact that TNCs have 
unrivalled levels of juridical privilege and power to evade jurisdictional responsibility.11 
  The link between globalisation and the proliferation of walls is reflected by the recent 
success of ethno-nationalist populist politicians capitalising on the sense that unaccountable 
transnational forces negatively impact upon livelihoods and life prospects.12 Resurgent forces of 
populist nationalism in Europe and the United States of America have gained ground in 
significant part by explicitly appealing to (selective) critiques of globalisation.13 At the same time, 
there is a growing collective sense that the current international order systematically favours the 
interests of a relatively small transnational neoliberal elite (the ‘1%’)14 while producing 
unprecedented levels of precarity for the masses.15 In the light of this particular, contemporary 
manifestation of global unevenness, we decided to explore the idea that the mechanisms of 
personhood and jurisdiction operate in favour of corporate capital at both structural and 
ideological levels—and that the contrast between TNC privilege and the relative excludability of 
marginalised human beings should be seen as a co-symptomatic dynamic with shared roots in a 
particular order of meaning and power. 
  Drawing—in part—on Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), 
postcolonial and decolonial critical scholarship, we examine personhood and jurisdiction as 
concepts and technologies intimately related to the intellectual, theological and political traditions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘The Anthropocene is the outcome of five hundred years of dispossession, capitalist accumulation, and 
neo/colonial globalization’: A Kanngieser and N Beuret, ‘Refusing the World: Silence, Commoning and the 
Anthropocene’ (2017) 116/2 The South Atlantic Quarterly 362-380 at 376; S Lewis and M Maslin, ‘Defining the 
Anthropocene’ (2015) 519/7542 Nature 171–80. 
6 P Kirby, Vulnerability and Violence: The Impact of Globalisation (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006); Sassen (n 2). 
7 Lewis and Maslin (n 5). 
8 For a discussion linking this point to the Anthropocene, see Malm and Hornborg (n 4). 
9 R Radhakrishnan, Theory in an Uneven World (Blackwell, Oxford 2003). 
10 T Marshall, The Age of Walls: How Barriers Between Nations Are Changing Our World (New York: Scribner, 2018). 
11 For a comprehensive study of TNCs, see P Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 
especially at 125-171; C Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of 
Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56-79; and for two salutary examples, U Baxi, ‘Writing about impunity 
and environment: the “silver jubilee” of the Bhopal catastrophe’ (2010) 1/1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 
23-44; S Joseph, ‘Protracted lawfare: the tale of Chevron Texaco in the Amazon’ (2012) 3/1 1 Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 70-91.  
12 See, for a well-established critique of such patterns, J Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents (New York and 
London: WW Norton, 2002). 
13 See, for example, GC Hufbauer and C Cimino-Isaacs, ‘Trump versus Globalization’ (2017) 26 The Cairo Review of 
Global Affairs 28-39. On the selectivity of appeals against globalisation, see Q Slobodian, ‘Trump, Populists and the 
Rise of Right Wing Globalization’ (2018) New York Times October 22nd 2018. 
14 Oxfam figures on wealth are salutary: The 2017 report is available here: https://www.oxfam.org.uk/media-
centre/press-releases/2017/01/eight-people-own-same-wealth-as-half-the-world (date of last access: 19th May 
2018). 
15 For a discussion of this and the related rise of a ‘global precariat’, see G Standing, The Precariat: A New Dangerous 
Class (London: Bloomsbury 2011). For further discussion of the dangers to democracy presented by neoliberal 
globalisation and the emergence of widespread precarity, see S Nasstrom and S Kalm, ‘A democratic critique of 
precarity’ (2015) 5/4 Global Discourse 556-573.  
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of Europe.16  We do not here purport to offer a close technical analysis of international law. Nor 
do we assume a hegemonic capitalist trajectory in which a single, monolithic form of corporate 
personhood assumes hypostatisation. We read the thread of hegemony traceable in patterns of 
coloniality and neocoloniality in the global order as being a reflection of a complex convergence 
between multiple, heterogeneous forces and actors. Despite complexities, however, we do see a 
recognisable, familiar dynamic in the contrast between TNC privilege and the vulnerability of 
corporeally specific human beings driven against national borders. This contrast, we suggest, 
gains renewed critical salience in an age marked by the rapid proliferation of walls—and in the 
face of the increasing likelihood of climate change-driven displacements.17 
  We begin by tracing the nature of the contemporary neoliberal legal order and its colonial 
roots. We then examine the constructs of legal personhood and jurisdiction as techniques of 
privilege and predation, revealing their threads of continuity with fundamentally colonising 
capitalist impulses and assumptions. Finally, we suggest some modest future research directions.  
 
2 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: COLONIALITY AND NEOLIBERALISM  
While the contemporary era is predominantly characterised by globalised and globalising forces 
and relations and by a profound and growing sense of an unevenly distributed Anthropocene 
predicament,18 there is nothing new about globalisation. Abu-Lughod traces early globalisation 
back to the thirteenth century Mongol Empire, 19 while Twining locates globalising dynamics in 
the well-established transnational flow of people, goods and ideas from at least the sixteenth 
century onwards.20 Nevertheless, contemporary globalisation marks a mutation and 
intensification of earlier transnational dynamics: the speed, density and content21 of transnational 
flows is so marked that it represents a qualitative shift from earlier forms,22 and is a highly 
complex assemblage of ‘economic, social, political, cultural, religious and legal dimensions’,23 
made up of a diverse set of processes, events and developments, some of which may be 
contradictory.24 For all this complexity, however, the ‘collective impact of very heterogeneous 
actors, markets, capital flows, supranational organisations and so forth, each of which 
understands itself to be making decisions in its own interest on the basis of economic 
considerations’25 produces a high degree of ideological homogenisation—especially in the policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 D Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
17 See S Chaturvedi and T Doyle, ‘Geopolitics of fear and the emergence of “climate refugees”: imaginative 
geographies of climate change and displacements in Bangladesh’ (2010) 6/2 Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 206-222 
for a discussion of this that highlights the construction of a geopolitics of fear and ‘boundary-reinforcing 
cartographic anxieties about climate change-induced displacements and migrations’ (abstract).  
18 Malm and Hornborg argue that the Anthropocene is marked by ‘differentiated vulnerability on all scales of human 
society’ and that ‘[f]or the foreseeable future – indeed, as long as there are human societies on Earth – there will be 
lifeboats for the rich and privileged. If climate change represents a form of apocalypse, it is not universal, but 
uneven and combined: the species is as much an abstraction at the end of the line as at the source’: (n 4) at 63.  
19 See J Abu-Lughod, Before the European Hegemony: The World System AD1250-1350 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). 
20 W Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000) at 7. 
21 Contemporary globalisation has been described as a ‘rush of products, ideas, persons and money [stimulated by] 
jet transportation, electronic telecommunication, massive decolonization and extensive computerization’: TW Luke, 
‘New World Order or Neo-World Orders: Power, Politics and Ideology in Informationalizing Glocalities’ (1995) 91 
Global Modernities at 99-100, cited by R McCorquodale and R Fairbrother, ‘Globalization and Human Rights’ (1999) 
21 Human Rights Quarterly 735-766 at 738. 
22 B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation (London: Butterworths, 
2002) at 165.  De Sousa Santos refers to a range of commentators committed to such a view: M Featherstone (ed), 
Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London: Sage, 1990); A Giddens, Sociology (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1990); M Albrow and E King (eds.) Globalization, Knowledge and Society (London: Sage, 1990). 
23 De Sousa Santos (n 22) at 166. 
24 U Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2006) at 235. 
25 U Beck, Power in the Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005/2006) at 117. 
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choices of governments.26 
  Such homogenisation has been particularly marked since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s. Market-driven ideology has extended liberal capitalism into a system of global 
reach favouring a uniquely privileged dominant agent—the TNC.27 TNC dominance is so 
marked that some scholars identify it as globalisation’s defining characteristic.28 Indeed, some 
scholars now identify the existence of a de facto global constitution for corporate capital29 in the 
form of a ‘new (global) constitutionalism’.30 This is an order of power in which nation-states are 
assessed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ on the basis of whether or not they are favourable ‘host states for 
global capital’—an assessment reflecting the ascendancy of a virulent market ‘morality’ that has 
overwhelmed older notions and measures of state responsibility and conduct.31 Moreover, as 
Baxi points out, the much-discussed ‘end of the nation-state’ thematic in discussions of 
globalisation really only means the end of the ‘re-distributive state’, marking ‘in some important 
ways … the end of the processes and regimes of human rights-oriented, redistributionist governance 
practices’.32 This is a situation in which ‘the state becomes a point, perhaps, not even a nodal one, 
in the network of intensified international economic relations in a “borderless world”’ for global 
capital.33 The ‘new’ global constitutionalism—and its ‘borderless world for global capital’—is 
legible, however, as the culmination of a pre-existing logic. It is possible to read neoliberal 
globalisation as a fundamentally neo-colonial enterprise by exposing complex but visible 
trajectories of continuity with earlier periods of primitive capital accumulation, colonialism and 
imperialism—linked by critical scholars to the genesis of the Anthropocene.34 This is the 
particular thread of continuity that we will bring into our consideration of the role of 
personhood and jurisdiction. We therefore introduce that thread first.  
 
2a Coloniality: The Story of Capitalist Imperialism 
Neoliberal corporate globalisation is, in a central sense, a Eurocentric matrix of power with its 
roots in the history of European colonialism35 enabled and legitimised by (early) international law 
doctrines and structures, the pillage and destruction of other cultures and the advancement of 
appropriative European culture and power36—and linked by some scholarly and scientific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 T Evans and AJ Ayers,  ‘In the Service of Power: The Global Political Economy of Citizenship and Human 
Rights’ (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 239-308, at 293. 
27 More than one third of the world’s industrial output was produced by TNCs in as early as 1995, and although ‘the 
organizational novelty of the TNCs may be questioned from a world system perspective, it seems undeniable that 
their prevalence in the world economy, and the degree and efficacy of centralized direction they manage to achieve, 
manage to distinguish them from older forms of international business enterprise’: De Sousa Santos (n 22) at 168. 
Beck characterises contemporary globalisation as ‘one of the most important changes there has been in the history 
of power’ (Beck (n 29) at 52) and TNCs as ‘private sector quasi-states’ (ibid, at 75). 
28 R Shamir, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case of Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony’ in B de Sousa Santos 
and CA Rodrigues-Garavito, Law and Globalisation from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 92-117 at 92. 
29 S Gill ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’ (1995) 24 Millennium Journal of 
International Studies, 399- 423; D Schneiderman, ‘Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the 
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism’ (2000) 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 83-109; S. Gill, 
‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’ (2002) 4 International Studies Review 47- 65. 
30 See the various contributions in S Gill and AC Cutler (eds.), New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2014). In earlier work, Gill argues that the new constitutionalism is the ‘political/juridical form specific to 
neoliberal processes of accumulation and to market civilization’: Gill, ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality’ (n 29) at 48. 
31 Baxi (n 24) 248-9.  
32 Ibid, 248. Emphasis original. 
33 Ibid, 246. 
34 Malm and Hornborg (n 4); Lewis and Maslin (n 5). 
35 A Quijano, ‘Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality’ in W Mignolo and A Escobar (eds.) Globalization and the 
Decolonial Option, (London and New York: Routledge, 2010) 22-32; A Quijano, ‘Coloniality and 
Modernity/Rationality’ (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 168-178. 
36 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 
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accounts to colonial antecedents of the Anthropocene.37  
  The discovery of the Americas, and their conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese 
monarchies, signalled the demise of the pre-existing ‘polycentric’ world of ‘several coexisting 
civilizations’.38 The discovery of America by Columbus opened the gates through which Europe 
entered the world economy as a decisive force. America’s gold and silver enabled the expansion 
of the Spanish Empire, while the establishment, a century later, of a transatlantic trade in 
commodities brought a new affluence to the Netherlands and England through banking, finance 
and shipping and established the foundations of early mercantile capitalism.39 The early TNC was 
key to such developments40and our selective genealogical account of transnational privilege 
begins with the early mercantile corporations.  Indeed, McLean argues that ‘the history of 
colonial expansion is [also] a history of the corporate form’41—a point with considerable 
significance for understanding the unevenness of the present international order.  
  Chakrabarty has argued that the entire phenomenon of ‘political modernity’, namely the 
rule by modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise—is impossible to 
think of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of 
which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of Europe.42 The obliteration 
of pre-existing diversity was an impulse expressing a fundamentally hegemonic European 
ambition with violent hierarchical implications.43 A variety of mystifications enabled European 
mastery: gender, race, time, subjectivity and Christianity converged into the matrix of power 
described by Quijano as ‘coloniality’.44 In this process, which was—again—largely a process of 
state-corporate colonisation,45 the homogenising changes imposed by Europeans resulted in a 
wave of material and semiotic dispossessions:  
The dispossessed frequently faced poverty and starvation, and the original accommodated 
relations between environment, humans and animals were fractured, sometimes beyond repair. 
European hegemony replaced such broken communities with hierarchical interventions, 
ontologies and European epistemologies imposed or imbibed through colonial institutions.46  
 European epistemological imperialism took control of ‘the writing of history’ and of 
‘time’, which became linear, notionally objective,47 suppressing other temporalities and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Lewis and Maslin (n 5). 
38 W Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity. Global Futures, Decolonial Options (Duke Press, 2011), at 3. Mignolo 
argues that ‘[a]fter 1500 the world order entered into a process in which polycentrism began to be displaced by an 
emerging monocentric civilization (e.g., Western civilization)’ (at 28). 
39 Anghie (n 36).  
40 J McLean, ‘The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?’ (2004) 79 Indiana Law Journal 363-377. 
41 Ibid, at 364. 
42 Chakrabarty (n 16), 4.	  
43 G Huggan and H Tiffin, ‘Green Postcolonialism’ (2007) 9(1) Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 1 
–11. 
44 Quijano (n 35). This is a concept also central to the work of Mignolo: W Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: 
Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (2nd edn.) (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
45 McLean (n 40). Koskenniemi argues that ‘[a] basic history of international law might treat the East India 
Company’s rule over most of the Indian peninsula from 1757 as an aberration—while it was merely the most 
conspicuous case of the basic forms of English and early French colonial expansion’: M Koskeniemi, ‘Expanding 
Histories of International Law’ (2016) 56 American Journal of Legal History 104-112 at 109. 
46 Huggan and Tiffin (n 43) at 2. 
47 G Nanni, The Colonization of Time: Ritual, Routine and Resistance in the British Empire (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2012). Chakrabarty argues that the ideology of ‘progress’ in the nineteenth century ‘made 
modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather . . . something that became global over time, by originating 
in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it’, a construction of historical time itself taking on a ‘“first in 
Europe, then elsewhere” structure’: Chakrabarty (n 16) at 7. For further discussion locating time as injustice against 
the production of the global, see A Grear, ‘Anthropocene “Time”’? A reflection on temporalities in the ‘New Age of 
the Human’ in A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed.), Routledge Research Handbook on Law and Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2019) 297-315. 
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multiple ‘stories’ expressing different world conceptions and histories.48 Over time, European 
‘modernity’ converged with colonialism in a totalising matrix of power controlling economy, 
knowledge and subjectivity,49 and from the 19th century onwards shaped the industrialised 
capitalist foundations of the present fossil fuel economy50 and the intensification of the trajectory 
towards the Anthropocene horizon.51 Indeed, it was the opportunities provided by colonialism—
the chance to accumulate land and raw materials to feed the Industrial Revolution unfolding in 
19th century Britain in particular, that provided the ‘rationale for investing in steam technology’,52 
a technology key to the spread of colonialism itself53—and famously linked by Crutzen to the 
inauguration of the Anthropocene epoch.54 As Malm and Hornborg point out,  
. . . a clique of white British men literally pointed steam-power as a weapon — on sea and land, 
boats and rails — against the best part of humankind, from the Niger delta to the Yangzi delta, 
the Levant to Latin America. Capitalists in a small corner of the Western world invested in steam, 
laying the foundation stone for the fossil economy.55 
 
 As Anghie has argued, it was precisely this combination of colonial suppression and the 
competition between Northern states for natural resources that laid the foundations of the 
contemporary international legal order56 in appropriative impulses re-enacting earlier colonising 
dynamics and extending the underlying ideology of Eurocentric mastery.  
 Law was central to such trajectories, defining the ‘subject’ through personhood and law’s 
reach through jurisdiction. The legal constructs legitimating Eurocentric power were initially 
embedded in the premises of ‘natural law’ and of Christianity. Vitoria,57 Suarez and the 
philosophers of the Spanish School of Salamanca found in natural law the expression of God’s 
will and thus constructed a ‘justification’ for the imposition of the European systems of 
dominium, private property, serfdom and mercantilism so alien to aboriginal social and 
communal tenure systems.58 Eurocentric intellectual and theological categories and concepts 
decisively shaped the juridical history of coloniality.59 
 Yet, while the Spanish colonies established a complex form of serfdom attached to the 
land in a quasi-feudal system, the English colonies were administered by a corporate structure 
driven by the pursuit of profit from as early as the sixteenth century.60 Mercantilism was thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Mignolo (n 38) at 156. 
49 A Quijano and M Ennis, ‘Views from the South’ (2000) 1/1 Nepanta 533-580. 
50 This is an explicit theme in Anghie (n 36). 
51 PJ Crutzen,‘ Geology of Mankind’ (2002) 23 Nature 415. 
52 Malm and A Hornborg (n 4) at 63-64. 
53 Bell argues that such technologies were pivotal in the extension of imperial political structures: ‘ultimately it was a 
cluster of later technological innovations that provided the catalyst for the transformation in political consciousness: 
some of the most spectacular engineering triumphs of the Victorians, most notably the ocean-traversing steamship 
and especially the submarine telegraph, precipitated a fundamental restructuring of imperial political thought’: D 
Bell, ‘Dissolving Distance: Technology, Space and Empire in British Political Thought 1770-1900’ (2005) 77 The 
Journal of Modern History 523-562, at 526. Moreover, ‘[t]echnological change was not important simply because it 
helped to meet imperial “goals” but because it reshaped the very identity and direction of the goals themselves’ (at 
529). 
54 Crutzen (n 51), 
55 Malm and Hornborg, (n 4) at 64. 
56 Anghie (n 36) at 211. This is the central theme in E Blanco and J Razzaque, Globalisation and Natural Resources Law 
(Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011). See, especially, 33-54. 
57 A Anghie, ‘Francisco De Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 5/3 Social and Legal Studies 
321-336. 
58 See, for various accounts of such processes, M Koskenniemi, W Rech and J Fonseca (eds.) International Law and 
Empire: Historical Explorations (Oxford: OUP, 2017). For the Spanish contribution in particular, see M Koskenniemi, 
‘Empire and International Law: the Real Spanish Contribution’ (2011) 61/1 University of Toronto Law Journal 1-36. 
59 Chakrabarty (n 16); Mignolo (n 38). 	  
60 M Koskenniemi, ‘Sovereignty, Property and Empire: Early Modern English Contexts’ (2017) 18 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 355-389. McLean (n 40) argues that the question of ‘whether or not collectivities have enjoyed distinct legal 
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embedded in, and dominated, the English colonial territories from their very early phases—with 
the corporation playing a central role in the acquisition of state and private power. McLean 
demonstrates how corporations first became ‘for profit’ trading entities in the sixteenth 
century.61 Tellingly, she notes that in ‘the first two decades of the seventeenth century, some 
forty companies were granted trading monopolies by their respective governments over much of 
the known world’.62 These monopoly powers covered trade and rights over national citizens 
abroad, and were an important source of national revenue as well as powerful corporate 
expressions of imperial and colonial ambition. The origin of international law is thus closely 
connected to Eurocentric Christendom, and to Eurocentric trade, mercantilism, capitalism, 
corporate power and resource extraction, all of which were facilitated by law’s calculative 
imperial design and philosophical underpinnings.  
  The fundamentally racist assumptions of Eurocentric intellectual and theological 
traditions were key to these developments. Race was used to decide and to define who could 
own property and who had to work on the land, and racialisation was used to circumscribe 
identities of the ‘other’, the alien, the stranger, and to legitimate the racist domination and 
classification of humans according to presumed markers of European rationality.63 In the 
nineteenth century, a systematic racialised agenda took hold in the same broad timeframe within 
which the capitalist corporation broke away from the state to emerge as a fully independent 
juridical personality.64 Colonisation through trade continued to express the racist logic of 
colonialism by other means in a period that also saw the crystallisation of the public-private 
divide.65 This divide, as is well known, is central to the liberal legal mythos that enabled 
European corporations to take advantage of a legal framework that falsely reduced the power 
relations between corporations and the racialised indigenous inhabitants of colonised lands to an 
exchange between individuals. Such patterns are central, indeed, to what Woods describes as 
‘imperial capitalism’66or what Banerjee, addressing the continuities between colonialism and 
neoliberalism, names ‘necrocapitalism’.67 
 The distributions of life and death operationalised by these continuities are central to the 
neoliberal order: Banerjee points out that the ‘practices of organizational accumulation’ that 
represent ‘necrocapitalism’68 emerge from the intersection of necropolitics and necroeconomics 
in forms of accumulation by specific economic actors in (‘post’)colonial contexts—transnational 
corporations being the paradigmatic example—that involve dispossession, death, torture, suicide, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identity has been crucial’ (at 364) to the history of colonial expansion and to its related questions of power. McLean 
traces corporate origins to the will of European monarchs. McLean demonstrates how corporations first became 
‘for profit’ trading entities in the sixteenth century (at 365). Tellingly, she notes that in ‘the first two decades of the 
seventeenth century, some forty companies were granted trading monopolies by their respective governments over 
much of the known world’ (ibid). These monopoly powers covered trade and rights over national citizens abroad, 
and were an important source of national revenue as well as powerful corporate expressions of imperial and colonial 
ambition, McLean (n 40) at 365.  
61 McLean, ibid, 365. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See the discussion of the history and construction of slavery and race in S Martinot, The Rule of Racialization: Class, 
Identity, Governance (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
64 C Federman, ‘Constructing Kinds of Persons in 1886: Corporate and Criminal’ (2003) 14 Law and Critique 167-
189. Federman’s research exposes the 19th-century corporation as ‘the new American man, the bodily expression of 
male power’, at 181, and it is abundantly clear from his analysis that this expression was also exclusively white. 
65 McLean (n 40) 370-1. 
66 EM Wood, Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2005). 
67  Banerjee addresses capitalist ‘practices of organizational accumulation that involve violence, dispossession, and 
death’, linking them in a historical trajectory between colonial encounters and contemporary neoliberalism: SB 
Banerjee, ‘Necrocapitalism’ (2008) 29/12 Organization Studies 1541-1563 at 1543. Banerjee explicitly bases 
‘necrocapitalism’ on Mbembe’s ‘necropolitics’: A Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’ (2003) 15/1 Public Culture 11-40, 
necropolitics being ‘contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death’: Mbembe, at 39, cited by 
Banerjee, at 1542. 
68 Banerjee, ibid, at 1543. 
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slavery, destruction of livelihoods, and the general management of violence. This is a newer form 
of imperialism, an imperialism that has learned to ‘manage things better’.69 
 
2b Neoliberalism 
A necrocapitalist analysis draws out neoliberalism’s complex perpetuation of coloniality, in the 
light of which neoliberalism itself emerges as an imperialistic project exercising power through 
juridical structures originally designed to facilitate European and then Western capitalistic 
dominance.70 
 The central project of neoliberalism has always been to ‘disembed capital’71 from ‘a web 
of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in 
other instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy’.72 Disembedding capital has 
driven forward a global policy of liberating market forces and corporations in a wave of 
privatisation, deregulation and through the selective hollowing out of the state.73 At the ballot 
box, early neoliberalism appealed to voters in large part because it successfully drew on the 
rhetoric of individual freedom and dignity,74 and neoliberalism, operationalised through the 
double-edged strategy of austerity and competition, has expanded worldwide under the guise of 
rational fiscal control and market driven reforms in significant part by calling on the name and 
cause of democracy and human rights.75 It is only belatedly that international organisations such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have acknowledged 
neoliberalism’s fallouts in terms of increasing levels of inequality, but sadly this concern responds 
primarily to the effects of inequality on economic growth.76 Meanwhile, unfettered market 
openness, in combination with the ravages of neoliberal austerity doctrine—essentially a state-
facilitated method for socialising the debt generated by risky banking sector behaviour77—has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid, 1548. 
70 Ibid; Anghie (n 36). The complexities of the trajectories involved in this are penetratingly discussed in S Marks, 
‘Empire’s Law’ (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 449-466. Marks analyses Hardt and Negri’s conception 
of ‘Empire’, which presents the relation between earlier imperialisms and contemporary global power as one 
characterized by deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, unevenness and the persistence of familiar patterns of 
othering: ‘With deterritorialization comes reterritorialization, in the sense that old dichotomies shape the operations 
of the new more complex systems of domination. That is to say, they mediate those systems, reflecting the uneven 
geography that is one of globalization's most widely remarked features. Indeed, Hardt and Negri observe that “the 
geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established during the era of colonialism and 
imperialism have in many respects not declined but instead increased exponentially”’: Marks at 464, citing M Hardt 
and A Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) at 43. 
71 D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: OUP, 2005) at 11.  
72 Ibid; Importantly, this web of constraints shields capital and property rights from democratic contestation. As 
Slobodian has argued, neoliberalism was, in its origins, a search ‘for models of governance, at scales from the local 
to the global, that would best encase and protect the space of the world economy. Neoliberals described this as a 
campaign against “interventionism,” but it was clearly interventionist in its own right’: Q Slobodian, Globalists: The 
End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018) at 92. (With 
thanks to Julia Dehm for this point). L Elliot, ‘World Bank Recommends Fewer Regulations Protecting Workers’ 
(2018) The Guardian, 20th April. 
73 Baxi (n 24) at 248-9; H Brabazon (ed.), Neoliberal Legalist: Understanding the Role of Law in the Neoliberal Project 
(London: Taylor and Francis Ltd 2016).  
74 Harvey (n 71) at 5. 
75 Evans and Ayers (n 26). See also, Baxi (n 24) for an extensive discussion of ‘trade related market friendly’ human 
rights. The relationship between neoliberalism and human rights is, however, by no means monolithic or 
uncontested: S Moyn, ‘A Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism’ (2014) 77 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 147-169.  
76 JD Ostry, P Loungani, and D Furceri; ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold’ (2016) 38 Finance and Development 38-41 at 40 
(Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/pdf/ostry.pdf Last accessed 26 September 
2017). 
77 Gill, ‘Globalisation’ (n 29), points to persistent state intervention to impose market discipline for the weak and 
protection for the strong. This takes the form of the socialisation of debt to bail out powerful financial interests 
have in both the global North and South by drawing on government tax funds and by cutting spending on social 
benefits such as health and education. The narrative of debt also acts to mask systemic inequality. See A 
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created the deepening income inequality and the increased precarity that now feeds a rejection of 
both globalisation and elite power.78 Gill notes that ‘one of the principal costs of the neoliberal, 
market-monetarist austerity policies, is persistent mass unemployment. Concentrated heavily 
among younger and less skilled workers, it partly explains tough immigration and asylum policies 
and . . . contributes to a potent mixture of social and economic dislocation, physical risks, racism 
and xenophobia’.79   
  Neoliberalism imposes economic and political subjection precisely by recasting 
coloniality through the imposition of monetary policies, conditional loans and structural 
adjustment programmes operationalised by a sophisticated meshwork of laws governing 
property, contracts and foreign direct investment.80 Questions of elite power—central to the 
unfolding of colonialism in earlier periods—were always central—and remain central—to 
neoliberalism. Harvey notes, in this regard, that ‘neoliberalization was from the very beginning a 
project to achieve the restoration of class power’.81 Indeed, Harvey argues that the most 
compelling interpretation of neoliberalism is as a ‘political project to re-establish the conditions 
for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’.82 Neoliberalism thus aims 
at managing and legitimating inequality, not at addressing it.83 Indeed, despite its apparently 
economic roots and the centrality of the market to its ideology, neoliberalism has intensified legal 
and regulatory controls in the service of extending economistic logics through all social spheres 
and is legible as a normative project concerning the nature of freedom and democracy, for which 
law is central.84 Neoliberalism is, in other words, an inherently juridical project and the mythic 
function of law under neoliberalism is relatively consistent with earlier liberal capitalist 
conceptions of law, with claims of neutrality, equality and formal rationality remaining 
ideologically central.85 Under neoliberalism, these normative claims are more destructively 
instrumentalised than in previous regulatory projects, deployed in order to legitimate stultifying 
levels of state control in the service of extensive neoliberal appropriation. Dardot and Laval, for 
example, argue that the deepening regulatory control of life under neoliberalism is a key 
characteristic of a  ‘totalising rationality … destructive of the welfare state apparatus’86 that had 
briefly interrupted elite accumulation of profit during the post-war period. Brabazon has argued 
that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995). 
78 Gill notes that ‘one of the principal costs of the neoliberal, market-monetarist austerity policies, is persistent mass 
unemployment. Concentrated heavily among younger and less skilled workers, it partly explains tough immigration 
and asylum policies and . . . contributes to a potent mixture of social and economic dislocation, physical risks, racism 
and xenophobia’: S Gill, ‘European governance and new constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and 
alternatives to disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’ (1998) 3/1 New Political Economy 5-26 at 6. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Beck (n 29) at 123 notes that countries in the Global South are forced to submit to neoliberal strictures by the 
World Bank and Western funding bodies, while Richardson notes that structural adjustments such as deregulation, 
privatisation and the removal of protective policies are most aggressively forced on the poorest and most 
marginalised societies: JL Richardson, ‘Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present’(1997) 3 European Journal of 
International Relations 5-33 at 21; ‘The IMF and the World Bank: Puppets of the Neoliberal Onslaught’ (2000) 31/2 
The Thistle, (available at http://www.mit.edu/~thistle/v13/2/imf.html Date of Last Access: 25th April 2018); See 
also, S Pahuja, ‘Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Re-Inscription of the North-South Divide’ 
(2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 749-813. 
81 Harvey (n 71) at 16. Harvey here draws upon the careful reconstruction of the data undertaken by Gerard 
Dumenil and Dominique Levy. 
82 Harvey (n 71) at 19. 
83 Brabazon (n 73) at 2. 
84 AC Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2003), especially at 16-59. 
85 K Klare, ‘Law Making as Praxis’ (1979) 40 Telos 123-135; Brabazon (n 73) at 2. 
86 P Dardot and C Laval, The New Way Of The World: On Neoliberal Society (New York: Verso, 2013) at 33. 
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neoliberalism as an ideological and theoretical project can be seen as the creation of a particular 
kind of society and subjectivity rooted in a very limited conception of individuality, democracy, 
and social life, in which public debate and dissent are minimal and contained, collective action 
discouraged, and substantive inequalities are ignored or celebrated as convenient.87 
  
  The state’s role in this process is complex: the state is ‘restructured . . . rather than 
restrained’,88 and reoriented towards facilitating and protecting market transactions, away from 
social concerns.89 ‘Particular subjects and social relations’90 emerge from this process, 
entrenching coloniality in new, arguably more complex, forms.91 Neoliberal globalisation can 
thus be viewed as a non-monolithic,92 hegemonic ideological project inseparably bound to the 
earlier European colonial project and co-productive in the rising precarity and multiple crises of 
the Anthropocene.93  
  As we will argue in the next two sections, personhood and jurisdiction played important 
roles in the evolution of coloniality and remain influential conduits for the expression and 
further accumulation of power in the neoliberal global order—as well as continuing to present 
complex challenges in the Anthropocene. 
 
3 LEGAL PERSONHOOD: PATTERNS OF PRIVILEGE AND MARGINALISATION 
This section of our argument will position legal personhood as a construct that, despite its 
putative neutrality, forms a conduit for the continuing influence of a Eurocentric rationalistic 
trope of ‘man’ that brings corporate juridical privilege and the privation and vulnerability of 
corporeally specific human ‘outsiders’ or ‘others’ into direct and problematic relations of 
injustice. Core to this analysis is a patterned politics of disembodiment central to the operation 
of TNCs as cloaking devices for the accumulation of elite capitalist power.  
Before beginning our critical account of legal personhood as a technique of dominance, 
it is important to note that posthuman developments and the pressures of ecological breakdown 
make it increasingly necessary to imagine potential new recipients of legal personhood and/or 
rights of standing.94 Indeed, such arguments are already passionately made by a range of 
advocates, scholars and activists, and novel approaches, such as the granting of legal personhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Brabazon (n 73) at 12. 
88 Ibid, at 5. 
89 P Mirowski, ‘The Political Movement that Dared not Speak its own Name: The Neoliberal Thought Collective 
Under Erasure’ (2014) Working Paper n 23, Institute for New Economic Thinking (available at 
http://cms.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP23-Mirowski.pdf Date of Last Access: 25th April 2018). 
90 Dardot and Laval (n 86) at 3.  
91 The reality is thus a far cry from economistic presentations of neoliberalism as the solution to political and 
economic problems and the source of individual liberty, as presented by FA Hayek, Road to Serfdom (London: 
Routledge, 1944) and by M Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962). 
92 While it is clear that neoliberalism has hegemonic ambition and implications, it is important to remember that 
neoliberalism is also multiple and contradictory. For an analysis, see J Newman, ‘Landscapes of antagonism: Local 
governance, neoliberalism and austerity’ (2014) 51/15 Urban Studies 3290-3305. As noted above, it is in part the very 
heterogeneity of neoliberal actors and dynamics that co-produce the degree of ideological hegemony operating to 
restrain choice as the policy level. 
93 Lewis and Maslin (n 5). See also SL Lewis and MA Maslin, The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene 
(London: Penguin/Random House, 2018); WE Connolly and BJ Macdonald, ‘Confronting the Anthropocene and 
Contesting Neoliberalism: An Interview with William E. Connolly’, (2015) 37/2 New Political Science 259-275. 
94 See, for example, LB Solum, ‘Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences’ (1992) 70 North Carolina Law Review 
1231; G Teubner, ‘Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law’ 
(2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 497. An extensive literature concerning the implications of a range of 
developments for legal and human rights circles around related questions: For examples, see P Cavalieri, The Animal 
Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001); CR Sunstein and MC 
Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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to rivers, animals and other non-human natural systems and entities,95 already exist. However, 
despite such developments, and despite the undoubted potential of legal personhood for 
imaginative, future-facing deployments,96 it remains essential not to underestimate the traction of 
Eurocentric, rationalistic assumptions underwriting law and legal personhood. Even when new 
forms of legal person are generated, there is nothing to guarantee immunity from the continuing 
ideological traction of law’s well-rehearsed patterns of privilege and predation. It is perfectly 
possible to foresee a world populated by myriad forms of legal persons/entities, in which 
familiar and long-standing patterns of marginalisation and predation persist. Even ‘rights and 
personhood for nature’, an increasingly popular approach, can continue to operate forms of 
coloniality by universalising ‘colonial modes of existence as natural’, as Rawson and Mansfield 
have argued that they do.97 In short, legal personhood is long central to law’s tilted distribution 
of power and privilege, marginalisation and dispossession—and it remains vital to retain critical 
suspicion, perhaps especially when calling on it for new, imaginative juridical projects.  
  We have already briefly noted the importance of the legal form of the corporation in 
colonial distributions of power, but we now turn to introduce in a little more depth the role and 
ideological structure of the form of law’s persons—including law’s ‘human’ persons—in the 
dynamics of privilege and predation at issue in the neoliberal global order. 
  
3a ‘Persons’, property and exclusion 
The construct of the ‘person’ has always performed a political function, and has been deployed 
in Eurocentric philosophy, ethics and law to denote beings or entities considered worthy of 
moral and/or legal concern, to the (admittedly complex) exclusion of others. While structurally, 
‘law’s person’ is analytically co-constitutive with the attribution of legal rights,98 rights—including 
rights as politico-moral claims—have always historically tended to privilege propertied elites99—a 
fact underlining the importance of retaining a certain wariness when brandishing the meta-ethical 
appeal of claims to rights and personhood.  
 The long history of struggles for legal recognition by marginalised human groups reveals 
the degree to which rights and personhood were always reluctantly and incompletely conceded.100 
A wide range of critical scholarship exposes the fact that the gradual historical expansion of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Famously, for example, the Whangaui River and the Te Urewera (a former National Park) in New Zealand have 
been granted legal personality: See CJ Iorns Magellanes, ‘“Nature as an Ancestor”: Two Examples of Legal 
Personality for Nature in New Zealand’ (2015) Vertigo (available at: https://journals.openedition.org/vertigo/16199) 
Date of last access, 19th November 2018. Iorns Magellanes notes, rightly, however, that ‘these changes have been 
agreed to for human rights reasons, not for environmental protection reasons’. 
96 For a fascinating discussion, see E Mussawir and C Parsley, ‘The law of persons today: at the margins of 
jurisprudence’ (2017) 11/1 Law and Humanities 44-63. 
97 A Rawson and B Mansfield, ‘Producing juridical knowledge: “Rights of Nature” or the naturalization of rights?’ 
(2018) 1 Nature and Space 99-119.  
98 The legal person and legal rights presuppose one another in an analytical sense: ‘The subject is a creation of the 
law, an artificial entity which serves as the logical support of legal relations.  Right and subject come into life 
together’: (C Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) at 233) though the substance of the 
relationship varies, not least in line with differing theoretical accounts of rights and legal personhood. See, for 
example: A Nekam, The Personality Conception of the Legal Entity (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1938); A Peacocke 
and G Gillet, Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); DP Derham, ‘Theories of Legal 
Personality’ in LC Webb (ed.) Legal Personality and Political Pluralism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958); 
N Naffine, ‘The Nature of Legal Personality’, in M Davies and N Naffine, Are Persons Property?  Legal Debates about 
Property and Personality (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
99 See, for example, the detailed historical account offered by M Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times 
to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). See also N Stammers, ‘Social Movements and 
the Social Construction of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 980-1008. 
100 Ishay, ibid; Stammers, ibid. As Stone has noted, rights were originally attributed to only a very narrow class of 
human beings, rarely to ‘others’ beyond family or tribal kinship networks, and seldom to women and children: C 
Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (2012) 0 Journal of Human Rights and 
the Environment Special Issue: ‘Should Trees Have Standing: 40 Years On?’ S4-S55 at S4, citing Charles Darwin, The 
Descent of Man (2nd edn, 1874) at 113-4. 
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legal categories of rights-bearers carries with it an entirely predictable set of marginalisations.101 
And while contemporary marginalised human subjects (women, children, indigenous people, 
refugees, climate migrants etc.) stand in more complex relation to law’s inclusion, neither the 
universal human of human rights, nor the legal person, have ever cast off a centripetal tendency 
towards an intrinsically Eurocentric construct prioritising the putatively rational, property 
owning, white male. Such a centripetal tendency is evident in the fact that all ‘others’ to this 
trope—including indigenous peoples—and ‘nature’ itself—are complexly objectified, and 
feminised,102 and cannot form central case instances of the human legal person.103 
 These archetypal conceptual patterns and their material expressions of power are also 
firmly embedded in constructs of international legal personhood.104 Koskenniemi argues that ‘the 
international doctrine of State sovereignty bears an obvious resemblance to the domestic-liberal 
doctrine of individual liberty’,105 while Nijman argues that the ‘individual and the collective (e.g. 
the state) Self are (philosophically) intertwined [and that t]his is self-evident as the individualist, 
subjectivist perspective has marked the deep structure of international law’—including, of 
course, the structure of international legal personhood.106 The state is, in many senses, the 
individual writ large—a continuity that comes as no surprise, notwithstanding the importance of 
rejecting a reductive equivalence between the sovereign state and the individual.107 Despite 
complexities and distinctions, a range of scholarship makes clear the fact that the ultimate subject 
of all forms of law is the privileged, ‘rational’, white male template central to Eurocentric law, 
politics, economics and philosophy.108  
 This master-trope reflects a particular set of subject-object relations that undergird the 
boundary function of liberal law’s two central ontological categories: persons and property. The 
binary contradiction between personhood and property is, however, rather more apparent than 
real. As Davies, Naffine and others have argued, law’s person is in reality constituted by property-
centred assumptions, and personhood fulfils an important ideological function in assuring the 
prioritisation of property and the interests of the propertied in liberal legal systems.109  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 There are various vigorous critiques of the stubborn exclusivity of the law’s human person and of law’s failure of 
true recognition for those humans who do not fit the template of the white, propertied European male. This 
exclusivity marks the entire history of human rights. See Ishay (n 100); J Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists 
and the Rights of Man  (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); D Otto, ‘Disconcerting “Masculinities”: 
Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law in D Buss and A Manji (eds.) International 
Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 105-129; D Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Rescripting 
the Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law’ in A Orford (ed.), International Law and its Others (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
102 For an invigorating critical ecological feminist account of this, see V Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 
103 Otto (n 101); N Naffine, ‘Women and the Cast of Legal Persons’ in J Jones, A Grear, RA Fenton and K 
Stevenson, Gender, Sexualities and Law (London: Routledge, 2011) 15-25. 
104 JE Nijman, ‘Paul Ricoeur and International Law. Beyond “The End of the Subject”: Towards a 
Reconceptualization of International Legal Personality’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 25-64.  
105 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Reissue) (Cambridge: CUP, 
2005) at 224. 
106 Nijman (n 104) at 26.   
107 K Knop, ‘Re/statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 293-344.  Knop rightly makes the obvious point that ‘States are not like individuals in the 
significant respect that they are not unified beings, they are not irreducible units of analysis’ (at 320). There is, 
however, ‘plenty of room for critique, for examining, in Kirsti McClure's words, “the complicity between the 
sovereign subject and the sovereign state in modern political theory”’: JB Elshtain, ‘Sovereign God, Sovereign State, 
Sovereign Self’ (1991) 66/5 Notre Dame Law Review 1355-1378 at 1375.  
108 P Halewood, ‘Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights’ (1996) 81 Iowa Law 
Review 1331-1393. The centrality of the masculine subject presents pervasive challenges for non-male others in all 
fields of law—even human rights. See, for example, F Beveridge and S Mullally, ‘International Human Rights and 
Body Politics’ in J Bridgeman and S Millns (eds.) Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1995). 
109 Davies and Naffine (n 98). 
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  In short, a relentless ideological and structural priority is given to a Eurocentric 
conception of possessive individualism, and liberal law—including international law—constructs 
its archetypal persons—as individuals, states and/or corporations (corporations are more fully 
discussed below)—on this basis.110 This explains why entities serving the interests of propertied 
elites present no difficulty as putative legal persons, unlike the marginalised human beings who 
can never represent paradigmatic instances of legal personhood: ‘[T]rusts, corporations, joint 
ventures, municipalities… and nation states’ have all been designated as rights-holders,111 and it is 
notable that corporations and nation-states, as was just implied, have historically tended to be 
idealised—at an archetypal level—as idiosyncratic embodiments of the paradigmatic liberal legal 
actor.112 
  The relentless prioritisation of property and its owners central to such patterns is 
thoroughly visible in rights-based national constitutions in Europe and the US,113 testament not 
only to the historical influence of propertied elites, but also directly continuous with the 
corporation-centred ‘new global constitutionalism’ of the neoliberal order.114  
 The construct of the legal person is thus legible as a property-centred assemblage that 
conditions multiple sites of capitalistic biopolitical governance. Legal personhood is a pivotal and 
mutable ideological tool for mediating exclusionary power relations. It is also key to privilege of 
corporations115and equally pivotal to the production of marginalised subjects intransigently 
marked as law’s ‘outsiders’.116  
  Against this background, and read against the long history of rights claims turning, in the 
process of institutionalisation, towards the re-inscription of the rights of men of property,117 it is 
easy to see why business corporations have accrued a form of corporate legal humanity118 
through the accumulation of rights originally reserved for the elite humans in whose image and 
interests they were first formed.119 The consequences of the ways in which legal personhood is 
constructed, while presented as a neutral legal concept, are incontrovertibly serious and too often 
overlooked120 by a significant number of those pursuing novel approaches to legal rights and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 J Nedelsky, ‘Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self’ (1990) 30 Representations 162-189. 
111 Stone (n 100) at S6. 
112 Federman (n 64). 
113 Ishay (n 100); L Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History (New York: Bedford/St 
Martins Press, 1996). 
114 Gill ‘Globalisation’ (n 29); Gill and Cutler (n 30). 
115 C Harding, U Kohl and N Salmon, Human Rights in the Market Place: The Exploitation of Rights Protection by Economic 
Actors (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); A Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). See also, MT Kamminga and S Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations 
Under International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000);  SR Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of 
Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443-545; P Blumberg, ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The 
Barriers Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity’ (2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 297-
320; CB Onwuekwe, ‘Reconciling the Scramble for Foreign Direct Investments and Environmental Prudence: A Developing 
Country’s Nightmare’ (2006) 7(1) Journal of World Investment and Trade 115-141. 
116 Otto (n 101).  
117 Ishay (n 100); Stammers (n 102); Hunt (n 115). 
118 Harding, et al (n 115); A Grear (n 115). 
119 On the accumulation of rights, see Grear (n 115); Harding et al (n 120); GA Marks, ‘The Personification of the 
Business Corporation in American Law’ (1987) 54 The University of Chicago Law Review 1441-1483; CJ Mayer, 
‘Personalising the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights’ (1990) 41 Hastings Law Journal 577-663; M 
Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).  On the corporate form as the image of the masculinist, property-centred subject, see Federman (n 64); 
K Lahey and SW Salter, ‘Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism’ 
(1985) 23/4 Osgood Hall Law Journal 543-572: ‘the business corporation is a perfection of the masculinist vision of 
self—existence as property, separation of accountability and enjoyment, abstract rules as justice, domination as 
ownership’ (at 555). The ‘corporate legal form . . . perfects and depoliticizes domination . . .’ (ibid).  
120 J Berg, ‘Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood’ (2007) 59 Hastings Law 
Journal 369-406. Berg notes that ‘[a]lthough many philosophers have struggled with the concept of moral 
personhood, legal personhood has largely been ignored outside of the corporate context’ (at 370). 
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personhood—an oversight that might prove increasingly in conditions of entrenched and 
deepening global uneveness.121 
 
3b The form(s) of legal personhood  
There are two major traditions in the jurisprudence of persons: one naturalistic, which draws 
closely upon heavily naturalised subtending notions of the human being, and the other 
positivistic, for which persons are generated by law as a technical fiat. For naturalistic accounts, 
legal personhood is a designation merely recognising a set of assumed human characteristics—
most notably, the capacity for rational choice.122 For positivist accounts, by contrast, the ‘person’ 
in law is merely a formal operational referent designating the meeting place of norms and their 
relations.123 While it would be natural to assume that the corporation is straightforwardly an 
instance of a positivist construct of the legal person124 and that law’s ‘natural persons’ are 
straightforwardly human, matters are more complex than that—and it is in these complexities 
that we find important clues to threads linking TNC privilege, Eurocentricity, coloniality and the 
pathological uneveness of the neoliberal global order. 
  All forms of personhood, even the most ‘natural’ are, in fact, a constructus.125 The ‘natural 
person’ of law, precisely because it posits a human figure as its direct substrate, heavily disguises its 
constructed nature.126 In contrast, positivist accounts are overt about the constructed nature of 
their person.127 Anything ‘can be a legal person because legal persons are stipulated as such or are 
defined into existence’.128 The explicitly manufactured, abstract or ‘empty’ person stands at one 
end of a spectrum, therefore, at the other end of which is the most exclusive of naturalistic 
conceptions, the archetypal rational liberal legal actor (‘the classic contractor’).129 Significantly, 
however, even the most abstracted and ‘empty’ of conceptions of legal personhood is forced to 
‘materialise’130—and when it does, it nearly always tends to do so as the archetypal rational liberal 
legal actor (the Eurocentric rationalistic legal man).131 Even the human rights universal, the most 
putatively inclusive naturalistic template, relentlessly prioritises the same submerged Eurocentric 
trope of the subject.132 In short, as Naffine concludes, legal personhood ‘fairly systematically helps 
to support a quite particular interpretation of the person, and one which has an intimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 A Grear, ‘“Mind the Gap”: One Dilemma Concerning the Expansion of Legal Subjectivity in the Age of 
Globalisation’ (2011) 1/1 Law, Crime and History 1-8. 
122 N Naffine, ‘Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects’ (2003) 66/3 Modern Law Review 
346-367 at 362. The ‘natural person’ of law is without exception considered to be of human genetic origin: Berg (n 
120) at 373. 
123 See, for example, Nekam (n 98).  
124 Naffine makes this assumption—an assumption that seems connected to the argument that ‘[a]nything can be a 
[positivist’s] legal entity’ (n 122) at 351. 
125 A Grear, ‘Law’s Entities: Complexity, Plasticity and Justice’ (2013) 4/1 Jurisprudence 76-101 at 84. 
126 Ibid at 88. 
127 Famously, for Kelsen, the ‘so-called physical person ... is not a human being, but the personified unity of the legal 
norms that obligate or authorise one and the same human being’: H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1967) 173-4. International legal personality is no exception, and despite reformulations, ‘within 
mainstream positive international law the established concept of personhood is indeed [Kelsen’s] formal description 
of “subject of rights and duties under international law”’: Nijman (n 104) at 32. 
128 Naffine (n 122) at 351. 
129 Naffine, ibid, at 362. Naffine identifies three templates of legal personhood in Naffine (n 122) but later, in N 
Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) adds a 
fourth category.  
130 Naffine (n 122) 355. Even Nekam, who offers one of the ‘purest’ positivist accounts, is forced to acknowledge 
that ‘the legal entity’ is ‘always something in whose experimental existence the community believes’—this, despite 
the fact that the legal entity’s qualities are defined by law and that ‘all the other eventual qualities of the beneficiary 
[of rights] will be totally immaterial from [the law’s] point of view’: Nekam (n 98) at 40. Radin, meanwhile, notes 
that law is forced to ‘take into account the real concrete human being as a prolific source of [legal] relations’: M 
Radin, ‘The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality’ (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643–667, at 651. 
131 Naffine (n 122) at 356. 
132 See references above (n 101). 
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connection with its companion concept, property’.133 Legal personhood, in other words, 
systematically privileges the elite, property-owning ‘man’ at the heart of the liberal political order, 
a construct constituted by the ‘Reason’ thought to justify the civilisational priority of European 
males over other humans, whether women, children, indigenous peoples, non-Europeans or 
non-property owners (including nomads).134  
 This submerged politics matters for thinking about legal personhood generally: all forms 
of legal personhood—including new and inventive forms—need to be critically evaluated for the 
degree to which they are drawn into the traction of this centripetal ideological construct.  
 
3c Legal personhood and the politics of disembodiment 
Key to the Eurocentric trope of the paradigmatic legal actor is its underlying, broadly Cartesian 
and Kantian disembodied ontology.135  Rationalist, property-centred ‘legal theory [has 
systematically underplayed] the mundane fact that in order for the law to function at all it must 
first and foremost have a hold over bodies’136— while simultaneously elevating a form of 
disembodied reason that detaches law’s paradigmatic person from that very same embodiment.137 
A slippery politics is at work here. Some bodies remain fully vulnerable to the operation of law’s 
ultimately coercive hold over corporeality even as other bodies are, at least at an archetypal level, 
selectively privileged by their simultaneous centrality and imputed disembodiment.138 The 
imagined inferiority of the non-European, the non-male, the non-white, the non-property owner 
and other ‘less than fully rational’ others turns upon their degrees and kinds of corporeality, 
emotionality, animality and other forms of constructed unreason.139 Kapur has observed in this 
connection that 
 
the liberal project could reconcile promises of universality with exclusions in practice through a 
clear and persuasive logic. Rights and benefits were linked to the capacity to reason, and the 
capacity to reason was tied to notions of biological determinism, racial and religious superiority, 
and civilizational maturity.140 
 
  Critical legal theorists of various stripes (feminists, critical race scholars, TWAIL 
scholars, indigenous scholars and so forth) have stripped back the impossible disembodiment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 N Naffine, ‘The Nature of Legal Personality’ in Davies and Naffine (n 98) at 56. Emphasis added. 
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Rights in the 21st Century: Take a Walk on the Dark Side’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 665-687. 
135 Halewood (n 108). 
136 P Cheah, D Fraser and J Grbich (eds), Thinking Through the Body of Law (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996) at 
xv, cited by SD Sclater, ‘Introduction’ in A Bainham, SD Sclater, and M Richards, Body Lore and Laws (Oxford: Hart, 
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‘separation of subjects from objects … shearing all distinguishing embodiment or particularity [and it is this 
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themselves’: TM Lurhmann, ‘The good Parsi: The post-colonial feminization of a colonial elite’ (1994) 29 Man 333–
357, at 333. 
139 Kapur (n 134); M Dekha. ‘Intersectionality and Post-Human Visions of Equality’ (2008) 23 Wisconsin Journal of 
Law, Gender and Society 249-267. For more, see (as referenced by Dekha) S Salih, ‘Filling Up the Space between 
Mankind and Ape: Racism, Speciesism and the Androphilic Ape’ (2007) 38 Ariel 95-111. 
140 R Kapur, ‘The Citizen and the Migrant: Postcolonial Anxieties, Law, and the Politics of Exclusion/Inclusion’ 
(2007) 8/2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 537-570 at 541. 
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the rational actor to reveal its all-too-particular ‘smuggled’ body.141 This body is unmistakeably 
that of the white, European, male, heterosexual paterfamilias, the archetypal citizen of civilised 
liberalism whose sociality resides in contractual exchanges and whose autonomy is expressed in 
the possession of property.142  
 It is precisely such assumptions that co-situate marginalised humans, non-dominant 
humans, non-human animals and natural systems in ‘entanglements of oppression’ particularly 
destructive since the advent of corporate industrial capitalism143—and increasingly troubling in 
the age of the Anthropocene. The ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning 
these assumptions remain powerful in the contemporary neoliberal global order, with its parallel 
hierarchical binary between the global North and South. Meanwhile, at national and international 
levels alike, ‘liberal legalism [deliberately occludes] both “the legal ordering of economic policy” 
and the inherently political nature of that legal ordering’144 in order to evade troubling questions 
of structural injustice. 
 
3d The TNC: The apotheosis of the liberal legal actor 
The ideological assumptions underwriting the forms of law’s human persons play out as clear 
critical strands in relation to the ideological structure of the corporate form. First, there is a sense 
in which the corporation is the liberal Eurocentric trope of the rational actor writ large; secondly, 
there is a sense in which the legal disembodiment of the corporate body is precisely what enables 
it to evade core vulnerabilities attaching to corporeal human bodies. 
It should be clear by now that our analysis links transnational corporate power to the 
privileges acquired by corporations from the 16th century onwards as carriers of European 
imperial ambition.145 The specific advantages arising from the corporation’s legal form are 
powerful expressions of structural continuities between property, elite male power and European 
rationalism in the international legal order,146 and the corporation’s degree of correspondence 
with the paradigmatic Eurocentric liberal legal actor is striking.147 Analysing the twinned 
production of corporate and criminal persons in 19th century North America, Federman 
describes how the corporation ‘[took] shape not simply as a bearer of traditional English 
liberties, but as a corporate “person”, who is not dissimilar to the bearer of traditional English 
liberties, and yet is structurally different’.148 The construction of corporations as private persons 
in law—a pivotal development in capitalist corporate theory—is a key source of their relative 
legal impunity in the global economy that they now so dominate. Their complex entanglements 
in the interests of capitalist states, moreover, further reduce their legal accountability. De Sousa 
Santos argues that it is precisely 
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Other: Towards a Feminist Theory of Embodied Legal Rights’ (1995) 4 Social and Legal Studies 55-73 at 56. 
142 K Green, ‘Citizens and Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law’ in Bright, S, and Dewar, J, (eds) Land Law: 
Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 229-256. 
143 D Nibert, Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation (Lanham MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2002) 
144 A Orford, ‘Food Security, Free Trade and the Battle for the State’ (2015) 11/2 Journal of International Law and 
International Relations 1-67, at 22. 
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[b]ecause of their private character [that] these economic actors can commit massive violations of 
human rights with total impunity in different parts of the world . . . [and b]ecause such actors are at 
the core of the loss in economic national sovereignty, their actions, no matter how offensive . . . 
are unlikely to collide with consideration of national interest or security that might otherwise 
prompt the corrective or punitive intervention of the state.149 
 
 The TNC has been deconstructed as a raced, gendered entity constructed in the image of 
the Eurocentric male subject.150 Moreover, the corporation enjoys a complex kind of legal 
disembodiment impossible even for the white European property-owning male and is 
simultaneously the very personification of capitalism.151 Accordingly, it is the corporation, rather 
than the human being, that supplies the ultimate instantiation of liberal law’s idealised person.152 
And it is the TNC that is the apotheosis of the corporation’s disembodied power to evade 
accountability by ‘disaggregating’ into distinguishable units, each constituting a separate legal 
person.153 It is this  
 
capacity of [TNCs] to organise their legal form in such a way as to avoid responsibility for harm . 
. . [that is such] a cause for concern. In the context of corporate groups, the avoidance of 
responsibility can be achieved by interposing a separate legal entity between the victims and the 
ultimate controller of the group, be it a parent company or its controlling shareholders. Such a 
use of corporate separation can also be used to ‘hide’ the controlling enterprise from being 
present in the jurisdiction where the harm has occurred, thereby making litigation against it 
harder. Though in legal terms such devices are entirely normal and useful for the control of 
investment risks they are also likely to externalise other risks, in particular risk of harm, in morally 
and socially unacceptable ways.154 
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 De Sousa Santos (n 22) at 268.   
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courts are reluctant to go beyond this narrow range of exceptions [in order] to maintain the strict integrity of entity 
doctrine’: ibid, 919. In short, as Dangerman and Schellnhuber argue, when it comes to TNCs, ‘what often is 
considered a well-balanced legal-financial construction has an asymmetric and unbalanced foundation’ (at E556): 
‘the specific legal-financial framework . . . grants sweeping power to the shareholders, who invest in, influence, and 
determine (through the pressure of the demand for immediate profits) the course of the company but actively 
blocks feedback . . . from any system that is or may be affected by the company’s decisions and actions. In other 
words . . . potentially stabilizing feedback loops that could confine unsustainable runaway dynamics are blocked’ 
(ibid): J Dangerman and HJ Schellnhuber, ‘Energy Systems Transformation’ (2013) PNAS E549-E558 (available at 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1219791110). 
154	  Muchlinski, (n 153) at 916.	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The politics of rationalistic disembodiment central to law produce the idiosyncratic, 
complex and mutable ‘disembodiment’155of the corporate form as a decisive advantage in a 
pathologically uneven global order—and has its origins firmly in colonial imperatives.156 
Dangerman and Schellnhuber make explicit the intimacy between the structure of the corporate 
form and the imperatives of coloniality. They argue, referring to the origin of the earliest public 
corporation (the Dutch East India Company, in 1602) that:  
 
Its owners neither wished nor expected to be confronted with the legal consequences of the 
actions and omissions of the economic entity in which they invested. In fact, they were not 
supposed to bear these consequences—these were colonial times. In an era when Europeans 
were discovering the existence of entire continents, the world appeared to have an endlessly 
receding horizon, and the indigenous people of the colonies were not necessarily considered 
important, let alone equal. In other words, when the shareholder company structure was formed, 
there was little reason to take into account a rationale for stabilizing feedback mechanisms … 
Then and now, companies serve as legal vehicles for generating immediate profits for 
shareholders and allowing investors to reap the benefits of expansion … without being 
confronted by the consequences of such harvesting dynamics.157  
 
  The legal structure of the TNC, emphatically, took shape as a tool of colonialism and the 
TNC’s disembodiment and the related mutability of dematerialised capital in a borderless global 
order for capital are thus entirely at one with the ideologically constructed exclusions and 
expulsions afflicting the marginalised ‘others’ which are so familiar to the injustices of an uneven 
juridical order. Legal personhood, in this light, far from being a neutral technicality, is legible as a 
legal technique of capitalist power. 
 
4 JURISDICTION: PATTERNS OF IDEOLOGICAL PRIORITISATION  
In this section, our attention turns to the operation of jurisdiction as another legal construct, a 
‘gate’ through which law’s privilege(s) is/are operationalised or denied in complex interaction 
with the privileges and exclusions created by legal personhood.  
  Our engagement with jurisdiction and jurisdictional technique is predominantly 
theoretical as we aim to discern key patterns of law’s construction of authority and control, 
selectively, over subjects and spatial realms.158 Our interest lies in exposing links between 
patterns in the construction, delimitation and exercise of authority.  We are not here concerned 
with taxonomic listings associated with doctrinal studies of jurisdiction,159 but with the structural 
technologies and metaphysics of jurisdiction that in McVeigh’s words ‘articulate both the 
potentiality of law and the conditions of its exercise’.160  
	  
4a Jurisdiction: Inaugurating law, shaping authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Halewood (n 108) at 1335. 
156 Dangerman and Schellnhuber (n 153) E556. 	  
157 Ibid. 
158  S Dorsett and S McVeigh, ‘Jurisprudences of Jurisdiction: Matters of Public Authority’ (2015) 23/4 Griffith Law 
Review 569-588, at 569. 
159 Such studies already exist: FA Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’ Studies in International 
Law (Oxford, Clarendon 1973); C Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
(2nd edn.), this section aligns more closely with S McVeigh (ed.) Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction (New York: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007) 3. 
160 McVeigh, ibid, at i. For an analysis of jurisdiction as a legal-political amalgam, see A Kaushal, ‘The Politics of 
Jurisdiction’ (2015) 78/5 Modern Law Review 759-792. 
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We begin our discussion of jurisdiction by positioning it as a construct that purports to 
inaugurate law and bring it into existence.161 Jurisdiction, conceived of as the power ‘to speak the 
law’,162 is thought to produce and define law’s boundaries and subjects and to determine the way 
in which the sovereign state’s legal authority is ordered.163 In most cases, problems of jurisdiction 
are problems about the limits of the exercise of legitimate authority.164 
 As a tool of government, jurisdiction actively works to produce ‘something’,165 and in 
doing so expresses an implicit assessment of (about/) ‘value’ understood in terms of state 
interest.166 A closer examination of the specific issues over which jurisdictional powers are 
exercised reveals that the authorisation of law closely relates to the construction of law’s purpose 
and imputed intention,167 and it is this construction of purpose and its associated values that 
concerns us most for the purposes of our present argument. As was just noted, jurisdiction both 
inaugurates, shapes and expresses authority168 and produces juridical and social identities.169 This 
discursive170 and inevitably material function is key to understanding the role played by 
jurisdictional practice in the production, definition, separation and exclusion of subjects and 
communities as targets of control. 
 As we move through a selected historical overview of jurisdictional technologies in the 
construction of authority, subjects and communities, two conceptual frames will be used. The 
first is the discursive and rhetorical distinction between ‘organic’ and ‘synthetic’ communities 
drawn by Ford.171 The second is the evolution and role of the concept of territoriality in relation 
to jurisdiction—and the dyadic distinction drawn between egocentric (personal) and geocentric 
(territorial) legality.172 While such binary contrasts can be destabilised by critique of binary 
categorisations in general, and there are in any case ‘too many ambiguous cases to allow for . . . a 
sharp bi-polar division’,173 this twofold contrast nonetheless provides a useful epistemic lens 
through which to observe the historical relationship between territoriality and jurisdiction and to 
frame the current use of jurisdictional technique by the neoliberal order and its actors.  
 Organic communities are understood by Ford to be a natural outgrowth or development 
of a pre-existing group of peoples and their principles. The definition of such pre-existing groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Ibid; S Pasternak, ‘Jurisdiction and Settler Colonialism: Where Laws Meet’ (2014) 29/2 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society Special Issue on Law and Decolonization, 145-161. And, as Sam Adelman observed in a comment on an 
earlier draft of this text, ‘In Hobbes’s mythical moment in which the social contract is struck, the Leviathan and his 
jurisdiction (his right to say the law) are coeval, and rights are ceded in exchange for protection—a tension that runs 
through liberalism like a recurring thread’. 
162 As a concept, jurisdiction is etymologically derived from ‘the saying of the law’, from the Latin ius (law’) and dicere 
(‘to speak’).  
163 J Bomhoff, ‘The Reach of Rights: “The Foreign” and “The Private” in Conflict-of-Laws, State-Action, and 
Fundamental-Rights Cases with Foreign Elements, 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 39-72 (Summer 2008). Available 
at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol71/iss3/3/ Date of Last Access: 25th April 2018. 
164 R Thompson Ford, ‘Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)’ (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 843-930 at 855. 
165 McVeigh, (n 159) at 4 and 39.  
166 M Keyes, ‘The Suppression of State Interests in International Litigation’ in McVeigh (n 159).  
167 Ibid. 
168 Dorsett and McVeigh (n 158) at 569. 
169 Ford (n 164) at 844, developed later in this section when examining the relationship between jurisdiction and 
territory. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid: ‘I must emphasize that the opposition described above is a conceptual distinction between jurisdictions. The 
opposition exists in the realm of rhetoric and discourse. It guides our perceptions and our actions, and may be more 
or less accurate way of describing the world. More importantly, its usefulness may depend less on its descriptive 
accuracy and more on its effectiveness as an epistemological filter. The dyad may not describe what we experience. 
Rather, it may influence how we think about what we experience’ (at 862-3). 
172 The terms ‘egocentric’ and ‘geocentric’ discussed by De Sousa Santos are chosen over the more familiar terms 
‘personal’ or ‘territorial’ jurisdiction because they reflect more accurately the use of jurisdictional technique by the 
TNC: B de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’ (1987) 14 Journal 
of Law and Society 279-302, at 281; 287. 
173 Ford (n 164) at 863. 
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is social and the space they occupy is thought of as ‘authentic’ and in some cases even as 
‘sacred’.174 Organic communities tend to be united by culture—including language, religion, 
social mores and/or ethnicity. They also appear to have a necessary (and therefore fundamental) 
relationship with the territory they occupy.175 This assumption of a pre-political foundation for 
natural organic communities in turn fosters the concept of ‘organic jurisdiction’, which rests on 
the premise of respect for pre-existing natural social formations. The conception of the nation 
state evolved from this premise.176 
 By contrast, ‘synthetic communities’ and jurisdictions are described as artificial, 
technological creations that exist to serve a specific administrative purpose.177 Synthetic 
jurisdictions are imposed on groups from the outside,178 and are formulated around ‘the 
individual’ (instead of the collective)—a monad predominantly depicted as a rational, profit 
maximising citizen—which, as we have seen, is fundamental to the production of liberal legal 
subjects and neoliberal subjects alike: ‘Synthetic territory is fungible. Its occupants are mobile 
and rootless; they are rational profit maximizers and technocratic modern citizens’.179  
 Historically, communities and jurisdictions conformed predominantly to an organic, non-
territorial typography. In pre-modern Europe, communities continued to be united by kinship 
rather than by territorial ties.180 Jurisdiction was thus an attribute that flowed from a ‘personal’ 
status, or, as De Sousa Santos formulates it, jurisdiction was ‘egocentric’.181 Thus, early modern 
European sovereignty was first ‘tribal’ and, later,  ‘imperial’ and territory did not have the 
significance that would later attain through the formation of the sovereign, territorial nation 
state.182 Two developments changed this conception of sovereignty: First, the rational, humanist 
movement, which marked the birth of the ‘individual’,183 and, secondly, the development of 
cartography.184 
 The mapping of territory transformed the focus of the connection between the sovereign 
authority (through jurisdiction) from personal status (clerics, feudal lords and merchants had 
separate courts in earlier European political formations) to an initially political and, later, to a 
territorial connection.185 The concept of territorial jurisdiction thus evolved alongside that of the 
territorial nation-state and a territorially bounded spatial connection between the state and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 For example, this is often stated of indigenous peoples: ‘[I]ndigenous peoples… have an intimate connection to 
the land; the rationale for talking about who they are is tied to the land’: Stella Tamang, Indigenous leader,  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. See also United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Arts 28 and 29. 
175 The best example is perhaps that of Israelis and Palestinians, and their relationship with the Promised Land and 
the Holy City of Jerusalem: Ford (n 164) at 850. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. Ford gives the example of electoral districts, made for administrative convenience (at 861). We could also 
add the partition of Africa at the Conference of Berlin, redrawing the map of the continent for the convenience of 
the European powers, in a purely artificial, synthetic, fashion: see R McCorquodale and R Pangalangan, ‘Pushing the 
Limitations of Territorial Boundaries’  (2001) 12/5 European Journal of International Law 867-888, at 878, recalling the 
partition of Africa. 
179 Ford (n 164) at 861. 
180 Ford, ibid, at 873, citing Maine: ‘it is … not true that the territorial character of sovereignty was always 
recognised’: H Maine, Ancient Law (Arizona: University of Arizona Press 1986 (1864)) at 98-99: The ruler of a nation 
was ‘the king of a people, and not king of a territory’ (Ford, ibid). Maine, as cited by Ford, explains that the origin of 
territoriality can be found with the Capetian dynasty whose sovereign evolved from the King of the Franks—a 
people—to the King of France—a territory: Maine, ibid, 103-4. This model was later adopted in England by the 
Norman conquerors: Ford, ibid; Maine, ibid, at 104.  
181 De Sousa Santos (172) 292. 
182 Ford (n 164) at 842, notwithstanding the existence of early European city-states. 
183 W Mignolo, The Dark Side of The Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality and Colonization (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1995). 
184 Ford (n 164) at 844. 
185 Ibid. 
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subject became the cornerstone of the modern nation-building project.186 In this project, the 
nation-state featured as a self-regulating homeland,187 and jurisdictional technique articulated a 
political (and geographic/spatial) division of the world and the limits of each sovereign state’s 
authority and power.188 Cartography enabled the marking of territory, and with it the creation 
and policing of geographical borders that ‘accurately’ demarcated the reach of the sovereign’s 
authority through the emergence of ‘jurisdiction as a technology’.189 The mapping of Europe, 
and, later, of the wider world, signalled the emergence of a new typology of jurisdictional, 
territorial and geocentric legality. This development did not, however, eliminate personal or 
egocentric jurisdictional technique—when European states expanded their imperial ambitions 
overseas both personal and territorial (egocentric and geocentric) models of jurisdiction were 
deployed, as and when required, in the service of dominating non-European subjects and 
appropriating their land.190 Jurisdictional technique was thus decisive in shaping the new national 
polity’s authority191 and in the production of forms of privileged and subjected political and 
social identity.192 Such technique was also central to the claim and exercise of dominium, and to 
access to, and control of, natural resources to finance wars and the expansion of European 
empires first—and later—to fuel the Industrial Revolution in Europe.193 
 Territorial jurisdiction, therefore, as we now understand it, is not only a relatively recent 
creation, but owes its current ubiquity and dominance to the central role it played in the creation 
of the modern nation state194—and to its legitimating function in facilitating capitalism, 
imperialism and the contemporary neoliberal global order.195 
4b Sovereignty and public authority: Jurisdiction as othering (and belonging) 
We noted earlier that jurisdiction as a materio-discursive practice and tool of government shapes 
authority in particular ways. Authority was not, however, in this context, always linked to 
sovereignty.196 Indeed, public authority was historically often separate from the civil authority of 
the sovereign territorial state.197 Mediaeval jurists’ characterisation of authority, for example, 
drew distinctions between the Crown, the Church and the merchant jurisdictions, and delineated 
a map of power between different orders—each representing different layers of authority.198 
Later, during the colonial expansion, other legal (corporate) subjects (of which the East India 
Company is the best known example) held authority without sovereignty.199 Public authority is 
accordingly perhaps better understood as a status-signifier pointing to an assemblage of different 
jurisdictional practices and devices and is not necessarily to be automatically understood as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Ibid, at 844, citing W Kymlica, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). 
187 Cutler (n 84).  
188 D Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’ (1999) 21/3 International History 
Review 569–591. 
189 Ford (n 164) at 867. 
190 McCorquodale and Pangalangan (n 178) at 878. 
191 Dorsett and McVeigh (n 158) at 569. 
192 ‘Deciding who governs where—the basic jurisdictional question—is not only important in itself but also has the 
effect of determining how something is governed’: M Valverde, ‘Studying the governance of crime and security: 
Space, time and jurisdiction’ (2014) 14/1 Criminology and Criminal Justice 379-391 at 382. See also, Ford (n 164) at 844. 
This theme is developed later in this section when examining the relationship of jurisdiction with territory. 
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196 Dorsett and McVeigh (n 158) at 569. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid, at 572. 
199 E Blanco, ‘State owned oil companies, North-South and South-South perspectives on investment’ in J Razzaque, 
J Shawkat and JH Bhuiyan (eds.) International Natural Resources Law, Investment and Sustainability (Abingdon: Routledge, 
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invoking ‘sovereignty’ or as dependent on or derivative from it.200 Jurisdiction accordingly 
‘speaks’ and mediates authority, even in cases where the authority in question is not sovereign. 
 Despite the fact that authority and sovereignty did not always coincide during the 
colonial expansion, sovereignty nonetheless became a crucial mechanism in the subjection of 
native populations in the colonies. Sovereignty provided a discourse that ‘legitimised’ the exercise 
of power and the ‘right’ of European colonisers to assert ‘authority’ over non-Europeans.201 This 
hierarchical set of relations was operationalised through a series of legal constructions and 
discursive ploys, key amongst which is the idea that in order to be welcomed as a partner in the 
family of nations, a potential ‘sovereign state’ had to possess legal personality.202 However, legal 
personality—as was implied in the previous discussion of legal personhood—was selectively 
bestowed. In line with the patterns identified above in relation to law’s paradigmatic actor, 
prospective sovereign states had to share characteristics preordained by the European powers, 
such as rationality—as well as to conform to certain requirements concerning race and 
religion.203 Sovereignty, in short, was defined precisely in such a way that it could be denied to 
the non-European world and was deployed for ‘othering’ non-European subjects, who were 
denied the constructed civilisational maturity and rationality of Europe.204  
 Predictably, and also in powerful continuity with the ideological co-constitution of 
personhood and property discussed above, the denial of the legal personality to, and, 
accordingly, the denial of the sovereignty of non-European peoples, enabled a particular type of 
legal dispossession.205 Non-Europeans were denied rights to territory except as consented to and 
carefully managed by the European sovereign through the development of territorial title—a 
concept that transformed territory first into property, and then, later, into a commodity that 
could be disposed of by the (European) owner-sovereign state. 
 Alongside this selective attribution of ‘sovereignty’ and legal personality, the jurisdictional 
technique deployed by the colonial powers imposed artificial (synthetic, in our earlier discussion) 
demarcations upon the indigenous under the pretext of recognising their separate subjectivity as 
a community—a move designed to differentiate between coloniser and colonised and to control 
the latter. Jurisdictional technique, in this way, imposed an order and authority that recognised 
some of the organic social characteristics of native populations but ignored others—just as the 
politics of selective disembodiment discussed above simultaneously recognises and diminishes 
the significance of human corporeality. Constructed as a non-sovereign people devoid of full 
legal personality, communities such as the Indians in the Americas were to be regulated by a 
different system of rules designated as ‘natural law’, since international law was reserved for the 
relationships between sovereign states.206 A centre and a periphery were thus constructed —a 
familiar pattern of privilege and marginalisation. Meanwhile, the racialisation operated by the 
privileging of distinctively European rationalistic subjectivity precluded non-Europeans from 
exercising authority precisely on the basis that their lack of certain characteristics rendered them 
incapable of holding sovereign power. The creation of empires through the colonial encounter 
was thus a site for the production of identity and difference,207 where jurisdiction operated 
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at 102-103. 
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204 Kapur (n 134); Kapur (n 140) at 541.   
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206 See, A Anghie, ‘The Evolution of Interntional Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’ (2006) 27/5 Third World 
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207 See, generally, Mignolo (n 38) and Quijano (n 35). 
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through an assemblage of techniques that enabled European authority over non-European 
subjects and legitimated the creation of bordered, walled communities,208 while sovereignty was 
constructed so as to predetermine the issue of ‘who’ decides what is ‘just’.209 These patterns find 
renewed critical resonance in the current order of power, in which jurisdiction is deployed to the 
advantage of vast, neo-colonial corporate assemblages in an age of rapid border-hardening and 
the proliferation of walls and barriers.210 
4c Jurisdiction in the Neoliberal Order: The Cartography of Power 
While a geographic vision and understanding of sovereignty and territory has dominated legal 
discourse for centuries211 questions of spatial injustice gain new traction, as we have seen, in the 
face of escalating globalisation under the conditions of which borders are—in a particularly 
xenophobic and exclusionary way—increasingly at the forefront of political and legal discourse 
and proliferating as modes of material expulsion and control. The world is not, in reality, a 
‘global village’ and while much scholarship on globalisation focuses on the weakening of state 
authority over its territory through the contemporary period,212 the constructs of territoriality213 
and state sovereignty continue to play important, ideological roles in the creation of privilege and 
exclusion. This point is highly relevant to the contrast between the two contemporary 
developments at the heart of our concern: the ability of TNCs to cross borders instantaneously 
while selectively seeking the protection of walled citadels of law to avoid accountability, and the 
plight of migrants and refugees facing barriers and boundaries painfully inhospitable to them and 
to their corporeal plight. Haunting our reflections on the contemporary legal order is the 
underlying background contrast between materially different kinds of bodies when they 
encounter visible and invisible boundaries of jurisdiction: Vulnerable corporeally specific beings 
come up against fenced borders, barbed wire, perilous seas, policed zones d’attente of exclusion 
and control, and rules of entry or rejection. By contrast, in a ‘borderless world for global 
capital’,214 TNCs—as complex corporate assemblages—can traverse jurisdictional lines with 
relative ease and impunity, shifting jurisdictions at will and demonstrating unrivalled forms of 
disembodied—yet profoundly material—legal agency.215  
  There is nothing new, of course, about law’s material action on bodies—or about its 
striation of space. Marking out space, driving out those construed as undesirable and/or barring 
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214 Baxi (n 24) at 246. 
215 Blumberg (n 115).  
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their entry is an ancient human practice and a well-rehearsed juridical strategy.216 As walls now 
rise rapidly across the world, those facing mechanisms of expulsive power217 and a wave of 
contemporary state and corporate dispossessions and land grabs218 face unprecedented and 
intensifying consolidations of control mediated by increasingly technologically sophisticated 
methods of surveillance regulation—all in conditions of entrenched and global unevenness.219  
  The organisation of territorial jurisdiction, as our analysis has suggested, is central to such 
dynamics as a technique for the construction of the reach of state power and/or of related rights. 
States operate as core facilitators of elite capitalistic privilege in the global neoliberal order.220 In 
this space law itself no longer functions on a single scale, the scale of the state—even notionally, 
because a plethora of complex transnational organisational assemblages operate in relation to 
authority and power, often in the shadows of legality.221 The density of transnational connections 
is such that a very different cartography of power also now operates, one in which international 
and supranational institutions and various networks operate in complex complicity with—and 
differing degrees of tension with—nation states, while corporate elites decisively shape the 
political and economic destiny of billions. This is no longer a world order, therefore, where 
dominant states violate the sovereignty of weaker countries with traditional strategies alone—
instead, new forms of debordering overlay and exceed older, traditional approaches.222 
Territoriality, the legal construct marking the exclusive authority of a state over a territory, is 
increasingly malleable and selectively hollowed out. What remains is barely more, in some 
situations, than a mutable mirage emerging and disappearing selectively according to the dictates 
of corporate neoliberalism and its privileged transnational corporate subject.223 Accordingly, the 
‘end of geography’224 implied by the denationalising of territory is a highly selective process. 
Territoriality remains very much alive as a barrier protecting the insider, howsoever 
constructed—most especially the ultimate juridical insider: the TNC.  
  The new cartography of power mapped out by global capital and enabled by the 
neoliberal state allows TNCs to exploit jurisdictional technique, avoiding territorial laws precisely 
by resorting to personal, ‘egocentric legality’ (in De Sousa Santos’s terms).225 A complicated web 
of ‘legal enclosures’ in the form of various corporation-friendly codes of conduct226 and 
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privatised jurisdictional rules227allows TNCs to oust the application of national state-based law 
and the territorial jurisdiction of state courts.228 Sovereignty is thus ‘decentred’ and territory 
‘denationalised’229 —developments revealing, on closer examination, law’s continuing complicity 
in the prioritisation of the economic interests of powerful elites. Earlier patterns are recognisable 
in these developments, and the creation of a privileged and now paradoxically acentric ‘centre’ 
presses to the periphery (in multiple contemporary senses) ‘the others’ to the dominant 
corporate actor. The constructed ‘centre’ is occupied by the TNC as key beneficiary of the 
system, while the ‘periphery’ is constructed as the ‘other-space’ of the poor, migrants, workers, 
refugees, indigenous peoples, the environment, and other living and non-human species 
knocking at the gates of the walled cities of law’s circle of concern.230  
5 CONCLUSION 
We have offered an admittedly brief and selective critical reading of legal personhood and 
jurisdiction, construing them as techniques of privilege and predation and as core elements in the 
production of a highly uneven, unjust legal global order that reflects and amplifies existing 
patterns of power. Like other legal constructs (re)presented as neutral, technical artefacts of law, 
legal personhood and jurisdictional technique reflect the historical and contemporary imprint of 
privileged Eurocentric—and then Western (Global North) mastery—a pattern subtending and 
characterising the Anthropocene231 and its patterns of coloniality.232 Indeed, the Anthropocene 
concept itself has been accused of a ‘somewhat hidden Eurocentrism’233—and criticised, along 
with ‘much of the analytical apparatus surrounding it—[for representing] an effort to expand 
(rather homogenized) European historical experiences, frameworks and chronologies onto the 
rest of the world … and [for hiding] a disturbing extension of colonial discourse into a 
postcolonial world’.234  
  We have drawn attention to the persistent influence of an underlying rationalistic, 
disembodied Eurocentric archetype ultimately instantiated by the TNC. We have traced, in this 
process, threads of ideological and material continuity between coloniality, capitalism and the 
neoliberal order, and we have noted that material, corporeal exposure to Anthropocene risks 
(which include the climate crisis) is, and remains, emphatically uneven.235  
  This unevenness is deeply troubling. As the legal-economic incarnation of capitalist 
power, the TNC’s privilege operates in stark contrast with the proliferation of walls and border-
hardening against marginalised ‘others’. The long arc of law’s complicity in the production of 
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global injustice and a ‘borderless world for global capital’236 makes the ‘walling of the state’ a 
particularly cruel response to the ‘fear of the dangerous alien’ now re-igniting the fantasy of the 
nation state as the besieged homeland sheltering the threatened national ‘we’ within its walls237—
whether that ‘alien’ is imagined to be the climate migrant, the political refugee or the 
economically dispossessed ‘other’.  
  Our reflection—by foregrounding key historical patterns—suggests that the unrivalled 
powers of TNCs to exploit the advantages of legal personality and evade jurisdictional 
accountability by utilising jurisdictional technique operate as a manifestation of power and 
oppression that ultimately takes significant energy from selectively weaponised notions of 
rationality and territoriality. Future research and theorisation exploring the contrast between 
law’s ultimate insiders and its co-symptomatically produced outsiders should, we suggest, focus 
particular attention on the feats of selectivity cloaked by law’s putatively neutral operations—and 
explore in more detail than has been possible here, personhood and jurisdiction as important 
levers of neoliberal exclusion and predation in the ‘postcolonial’ global order.  
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